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Abstract 
This paper presents a novel design methodology based on a new set 
of design principles to develop step-by-step security protocols for up to three 
participants, guiding the designer on each step. It accompanies the designer 
through a succession of six abstraction levels proposed in this work: protocol 
objectives, protocol constraints, security mechanisms, message flow, 
protocol conformation and authentication tests. The methodology proposed 
is based on a new set of design principles extracted from different sources 
and combined using the systemic approach, which considers the designer and 
client’s security and functional needs. The resulting model separates high-
level tasks from implementation details, allowing the designer to specify the 
security requirements and functionality desired for each abstraction level. 
Consequently, the protocol design is linked with the best-fitting design 
principle. To corroborate the results of the methodology, the resulting 
protocol in the Alice and Bob notation in the fifth level is tested using the 
“Strand Spaces” Model. The Needham-Schroeder protocol with symmetric 
keys was successfully used as a test. The security goals achieved were: 
authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation. 
 
Keywords: Security protocols, authentication, protocol design, methodology 
 
1. Introduction 
The design of security protocols is a problem constantly confronted 
by security experts. With increasing demands for functionality and 
reliability, protocol sizes and complexities have expanded. Currently, 
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designers face several challenges while creating a security protocol, namely 
the fundamental challenge of how to gather a series of rules for exchanging 
information that at the same time are complete, minimal and logically 
consistent, that may be efficiently implemented (Holzmann, 1991) and 
provide functional and/or security requirements. To face those challenges, 
there is a need for tools to help designers create protocols that respond to 
such increasing complexities. In this paper we present such a tool: a novel 
step-by-step methodology based upon a hierarchical structure, for the design 
of security protocols for two or three participants, where not only their 
security and functional needs are taken into account, but also the most 
appropriate design principles.  
This methodology presents a new set of protocol design principles 
arranged in hierarchical levels that facilitate designers’ creative process, 
showing a feasible, inexpensive and safe way to produce a protocol, in the 
Alice and Bob notation. In the lowest level we finish by converting the new 
protocol to the Strand Spaces Model, in order to corroborate results through 
authentication tests.  
Although design principles have been in use since the 90s, in this 
paper we take a strictly systemic approach (Checkland, 1991; Van Gigch, 
1974; Wilson, 1992), extracting their essence and integrating them in 
different abstraction levels. Many such principles are written to account for 
various aspects of security goals and mechanisms, plus the synergy obtained 
from their application. We based our search for design principles on those 
that are critically examined in the scientific literature and accepted by the 
scientific community, as presented in section 2.  
With this methodology designers can formalize explicit assumptions 
about underlying cryptographic algorithms and about trust (Choi, 2006), 
clarify protocol objectives, define detailed specifications of internal actions 
of protocol agents and verify messages and their parts on receipt (Fidge, 
2001).  
Our first contribution is the proposal of a new set of design principles 
integrated at each abstraction level of the methodology, instead of 
continuously reviewing the principles at each step of a design process. 
Our second contribution is the methodology itself, which not only 
involves the most relevant concepts of design principles on each abstraction 
level as presented in Section 3.1, but also includes, in Table 2, a path for the 
clear definition of protocol objectives that contains the main functionalities 
of security protocols appearing in the principal repositories (AVISPA, n.d.; 
SPORE, n.d.) and standards (ISTF, 2013), which typically include 
authentication of the participants and/or messages, and definition or use of 
secret keys for short or long term.   
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The third contribution, in Table 5, is a combination of mechanisms 
that helps to achieve authentication, one of the main goals of security 
protocols, and also helps with the other three: confidentiality, integrity and 
non-repudiation. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
Typically there are three main techniques used to design a protocol: 
the first is the optimization of a current implementation without changing its 
functionality, but simply reducing its processing costs; the second is the 
development of new mechanisms, reengineering existing protocols, in order 
to reduce conflicts arising from a particular feature of the operating 
environment, for example to get fairness in a contract signing, using an 
online trusted third party. The third technique is the development of new 
protocols, tailored to exactly match the needs of a given application; its main 
drawback is the cost of developing a specialized protocol, being that the 
security of a protocol depends on information that is either given as informal 
contextual description or implicitly assumed. Current techniques for creating 
security protocols deal with the human interaction and knowledge; the 
designer states the security goals and finally creates a corresponding security 
protocol (Oceanasek & Sveda, 2006). 
The idea of developing design principles for security protocols 
originated from the observation that successful attacks against these 
protocols were the result of malpractices in design, even more, it was 
observed that good design principles can lead us to build more robust 
protocols. Over time, design principles for security protocols have shown 
completeness and consistency and have been accepted by the scientific 
community. 
This work is based on design principles proposed by the scientific 
community (Abadi & Needham, 1996; Anderson & Needham, 1995; Aura, 
1997; Carlsen, 1994; Dong, Chen, Wen, & Zheng, 2007; Gritzalis, Spinellis, 
& Georgiadis, 1999; Khurana, Bobba, Yardley, Agarwal, & Heine, 2010; 
Malladi, 2008; Syverson, 1996; Xianxian, Hun, & Zhaohao, 2004; Zheng, 
2000). Although these principles do not readily apply because they tend to be 
written independently and address multiple problems, here we present those 
considered most useful as a reference to compare designs in search of faults. 
We began with those provided by Abadi and Needham (1996) and enriched 
by other authors (Anderson & Needham, 1995; Aura, 1997; Carlsen, 1994; 
Dong, et al., 2007) that include principles appropriate to technological 
advances or meant to delve into cryptographic details. 
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2.1 Abadi and Needham Design Principles 
The seminal work of Abadi and Needham (1996) is considered within 
the scientific community as a breakthrough in the development of security 
protocols; they noticed that several common characteristics difficult to 
analyze in published protocols could be avoided and guide to error 
prevention. Therefore, in order to prevent confusion and errors, they 
proposed a set of informal guidelines to complement formal design methods 
to a level of detail that indicates what and how. 
 
2.2 Design principles from other authors 
With the aim of updating the principles of Abadi and Needham 
(1996), based on an improvement in their application, in other viewpoints or 
on technology changes, we include additional principles, collected from 
accepted scientific literature. 
Aura (1997) proposes five strategies against replay attacks whose 
systematic application leads to achieve desirable properties. Carlsen (1994) 
proposes principles directed toward understanding and classification of flaws 
in the protocols, measuring against different categories of faults that may be 
present explicitly in the specifications or implicitly when the specification 
has been incomplete; his proposal is closely related to the design level. Dong 
et al. (2007) introduce a new concept called "protocol engineering" into three 
groups: security (1-5), detailed design (6-9) and provable security (10). They 
visualize the design as Systems Engineering, pointing out the explicit 
relationship between security and design, including the environment in 
executions and emphasizing in obtaining strength in safety and accuracy of 
cryptographic services. Anderson and Needham (1995) extend to the public 
key scheme the principles of Abadi and Needham (1996), emphasizing the 
design level, explicit assumptions, and the extension to more complex 
protocols. 
 
2.3 Authentication tests based upon the Strand Space Model 
Authentication tests using the Strand Space Model (Guttman & 
Thayer-Fábrega, 2002) are evidences of authenticity that give the possibility 
to infer that participants in a protocol run are not intruders; in other words: 
are evidences of authenticity that allow inferring that some principal 
possessing relevant key material has received and transformed a message 
carrying a distinct value. The authors embody these ideas in three tests: 
outgoing, incoming and unsolicited; their results allow us to establish 
authentication without any consideration of the dynamic execution of 
protocols, involving the activity of several principals. Instead, it is sufficient 
to consider the possible behaviors of the principals independently. 
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The rules of the protocol determine which transformations are 
permitted, because security protocols are designed to control the ways that 
protocol participants transform messages (Doghmi, Guttman, & Thayer-
Fábrega, 2007). The protocol determines when a critical value may be 
transmitted within new forms of messages, when such a critical value has 
occurred only within a particular set of cryptographic contexts, then a 
participant may be authenticated by the way it transforms into new contexts. 
 
3. Methodology 
From a systemic and systematic study of the design principles of 
Abadi and Needham (1996), Anderson and Needham (1995), Aura (1997), 
Carlsen (1994) and Dong et al. (2007), we decided to separate them based on 
security goals related to security mechanisms; because in some cases one 
principle affects different levels of abstraction in the design process. Once 
separated, we have classified them, placing each one in the level where it 
would provide more aid, according to the needs of functionality and security 
that we had to accomplish. We have identified six levels, depending on the 
problem being addressed; our methodology is presented in Figure 1, 
structured from the higher, first level to the fifth that has detailed 
implementation considerations, finishing in the sixth with authentication 
tests. 
Figure 1: Methodology outline 
 
3.1 Selection and classification of design principles 
In order to combine the design process based on levels of abstraction, 
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with the set of selected design principles, we proposed the key terms of the 
principles, such as predictable numbers (counters, timestamps, nonces), 
encryption, digital signature, key, session key, long-term key, symmetric 
cipher and asymmetric cipher, through a systematic analysis process; relating 
each key term of each principle with the proposed security goals: 
authentication, confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation. Then we 
assigned each principle with the abstraction level that best fitted it, taking 
into account primarily the problem faced in that level of the design process.  
We obtained a group of five levels of questions and suggestions for 
designers for review considerations which in turn are constrained by 
decisions made at the highest levels, so that when a designer applies all the 
steps successively in the top-down methodology, all design principles are 
covered and applied. 
 
3.1.1 Level 1 
It is related upon the protocol´s operating environment, with explicit 
trust relationships on which it depends, allowing us to document the ways in 
which the security requirements are met within the domains that interact in 
the environment, the assumptions made in key agreements and the reasons 
for this necessary dependence. 
 
3.1.2 Level 2 
It analyzes the attack model and the skills of the adversary, the 
designer has to express their needs as a result of the threats perceived by 
each participant, expressing them first as security goals and then as 
requirements for the protocol; these data are directly related with the 
operating environment. At this point we must express the strength required 
for the protocol, checking operating conditions (existing circumstances) and 
restrictions (regulation or limitation) embodied in the previous level, 
detailing further assumptions of trust and secrecy for each participant, 
specifying the use of any certification authority. 
 
3.1.3 Level 3 
It is related to specific content, timing and performance conditions of 
the messages, as well as an understanding of the trust assumptions made in 
key agreements; it is also related to explicit mention of participants’ names 
to show their identity and to authenticate its aliveness, as much as knowing 
the reasons to encrypt, digitally sign, generate nonces and time stamps, under 
a clear comprehension of the assumed properties. In the same way, it 
recommends to use available formalisms for specifying the messages, having 
the restrictions clear. 
European Scientific Journal   January 2014  edition vol.10, No.3  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
163 
 
3.1.4 Level 4 
It is related to the precise shape of the messages and their acting 
conditions; each message has to say what it means, so that their 
interpretation depends only on its content, without knowing the context. 
Each message has to be explicit in defining the parameters of the 
cryptographic primitives and any property that can be used to attack them. 
 
3.1.5 Level 5 
It is related to identification of details of the protocol and execution 
levels, and with details to be taken into account during the programming and 
implementation of the protocol. Among the recommendations are: to apply 
different words associated with each primitive type, placing an identifier in 
the protocol, in the step of the protocol, in the sub-elements of the message 
and in the run number; as the representation depends on the implementation, 
perform the bit count of all operating in the message. 
 
3.1.6 Level 6 
This level is concerned with authenticity tests; these tests give the 
possibility to infer, using the Strand Spaces model that participants in the 
execution of a protocol are not invaders. These tests are evidence that allow 
us to infer that a participant in possession of key has received and 
transformed a message, returning a different value.  
 
4. Results 
There are six levels in the model, in order to improve its usage we 
recommend to review the design using successive refinements in each. 
 
4.1 Protocol objectives 
Overview of what the designer wants to achieve with the protocol, 
indicating the operating environment, the participants, their roles, potential 
information flows, the flows order of presentation, the assumptions made in 
key agreements and the reasons for this necessary dependence. 
The designer will describe the environment and through what means 
the information transmission will be carried out. The process will be of 
successive refinements, in order to achieve protocol´s objectives and its 
functional requirements. 
 
The designer should be clear about: 
1. What he wants to do with the protocol? 
2. How many participants will the protocol have?  
3. Who are the participants, the role of each and if it will need to 
include a trusted third party or authentication server, which can be 
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online or offline. The former is considered a tripartite protocol, the 
latter bipartite because we assume that keys have been previously 
established. 
4. What information is going to be sent and received? 
5. What is the order of the information that will be sent and received? 
6. Development of an information flow table according to the number of 
participants, considering that the initiator is always (a) and may 
initiate the transmission with the second (b) or the third participant 
(s) also it must be taken into consideration that interactions are 
always alternated. 
A simple example of these (partial) flows is presented in Table 1, 
where (a) initiates with a message to (b), who responds to (a) accepting the 
conversation; then (a) also asks a trusted third party to participate. Later we 
will delve further into these flows in more detail, using a thorough 
exemplification. 
Table 1: Information Flow 
 
 
From Table 1 of Information Flow, the designer has to identify those 
data that each participant should uniquely know, because they could increase 
the flow number, if it’s needed to spread a message into its parts. If so 
increased, assure that flows are alternated between participants; otherwise 
they must be reorganized. 
Then the designer has to answer the following questions to validate 
that his choices meet the stated objectives previously defined at the 
beginning of this level; otherwise, he shall redefine the objectives and redo 
all following steps: 
1. In what environment will the protocol operate? So that 
participants and infrastructure are directly related to objectives. 
2. What authentication kind the designer wishes to achieve? So 
authentication is related to objectives. 
3. The kind of keys to be used: short or long term? So keys are 
directly related to objectives. 
4. If short term keys, they may be previously generated (key 
transport) or with the use of an online server (contributory keys), 
the establishment of keys is essentially a message authentication, 
where the key is the message 
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5. If long term keys, they could be: symmetric or asymmetric 
encryption (with the use of an online server); or previously 
generated keys. 
By answering to the previous questions, the designer can locate more 
precisely on Table 2, the protocol type that he has to design. 
 
4.2 Protocol constraints 
Description of the environment and user-demanded conditions to be 
met by participants, based on perceived threats related to information flows 
and security goals to accomplish. 
Once information flows are identified and design so far complies 
with objectives, the designer will then review the contents description, 
specifying in detail the information exchanged and threats perceived by each 
participant, applying the Dolev-Yao Model (Cervesato, 2001; Dolev & Yao, 
1983), to link threats to security goals, as presented in Table 3. 
There must exist at least one link between each threat and a security 
goal; otherwise the designer shall redefine the objectives going to the first 
level. 
 
4.3 Security Mechanisms 
Description of the security mechanisms appropriate for each 
information flow, necessary for the implementation of the constraints 
indicated. 
The designer will link the security goals he wants to achieve with the 
security mechanisms listed in Section 3.1 and summarized in Table 5, 
analyzing each information flow and content separate into parts to determine 
what to encrypt, where to use a digital signature, or where to apply a hash, 
etc. At least one mechanism is required to deal with each detected threat 
related to each security goal, gradually scoring the resulting matrix of the 
previous level, taking into account the flow and the recommendations of the 
design principles. An exemplification of the process to link security goals 
with security mechanisms is shown in Table 4. 
These eight mechanisms applied directly or in combination provide 
different strengths to protocols, knowing that higher strengths typically 
involve greater computational complexity, so we recommend analyzing the 
computational capabilities of participants to choose the appropriate 
mechanism. We also recommend not only to authenticate the entity, but also 
to ensure its aliveness and/or its freshness, so we must include appropriate 
mechanisms to do so as presented in Table 5. 
There must be at least one security mechanism attached to each 
security goal; otherwise the designer shall redefine the objectives going to 
the first level. 
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To achieve the confidentiality goal, as a general rule encryption 
should be applied; it could also be for a given field or for a specified time. In 
order to ensure confidentiality and freshness of a message, appropriate 
protection for data integrity should be provided. To achieve integrity in 
general a hash function or in a particular field should be used. And to 
achieve non-repudiation, a digital signature or a confirmation of the message 
content (ensuring the integrity of the message) should be employed 
Table 2: Relations between use or establishment of keys and authentication 
 
Table 3: Information flow, threats and security goals 
Links between information flow - threat - security goal 
Flow 
number 
Information 
direction 
Information 
exchanged Threat 
Authen-
tication 
Confiden-
tiality 
Inte-
grity 
Non 
repu-
diation 
1 From a to b 
Intent to 
form a 
session key 
with b 
Communi-
cating with 
an attacker 
X   X 
 
Keys type Use or setting keys Keys usage Participants Authenti-cation 
Session or 
short-term 
keys 
Key transport 
Previously 
generated 
keys 
2 
a, b 
Sender 
Receiver 
Mutual 
Message 
Session or 
short-term 
keys 
Contributory 
agreement 
With the 
use of an 
online 
server 
3 
a, b, s 
Sender 
Receiver 
Mutual 
Server 
Message 
Long-term 
keys Symmetric cipher 
Previously 
generated 
keys 
2 
a, b 
Sender 
Receiver 
Mutual 
Message 
With the 
use of an 
online 
server 
3 
a, b, s 
Sender 
Receiver 
Mutual 
Server 
Message 
Long-term 
keys 
Asymmetric 
Encryption System 
PKI 
Previously 
generated 
keys 
2 
a, b 
Sender 
Receiver 
Mutual 
Message 
With the 
use of an 
online 
server 
3 
a, b, s 
Sender 
Receiver 
Mutual 
Server 
Message 
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Table 4: Information flow, security goals and mechanisms 
Table linking information flow - security goal - mechanism 
Flow 
number 
Infor-
mation 
flow 
Information 
exchanged 
Authenti-
cation 
Confiden-
tiality 
Inte-
grity 
Non 
repudiation 
1 From a to b 
Intent to form a 
session key with b 
X sender 
name   
X Sender 
digital signature 
 
Table 5: Summary of authentication 
Table Summary of Authentication 
Authen-
ticated 
entity 
Directly 
authenticates the 
entity 
Aliveness Freshness 
Authenticates 
entity 
indirectly 
Mechanism-1 Mechanism-2 Mechanism-3 Mechanism-4 
Sender name Time stamp 
Nonce or counter 
*Predictable 
quantity 
Encryption 
Receiver name Time stamp 
Nonce or counter 
*Predictable 
quantity 
-------- 
Message 
Digital signature 
**Non 
repudiation 
Hash function   
**Integrity and 
confidentiality 
-------- -------- 
* A predictable quantity can be a nonce, a counter or time stamp. 
** Using the selected mechanism, you can also achieve the indicated security goals. 
 
4.4 Message Flow 
Conversion of information flow in messages and sub messages for 
the application of the specific mechanisms needed to meet security goals. 
Information flow will be transformed into messages and sub-messages, by 
reviewing the detail achieved in the third level; in such case that more than 
one message is needed at a given flow, the process must return to the first 
level, to restate order and content. We will form Table 6 analyzing and 
relating each of the resulting messages with the appropriate mechanisms 
according to the characteristics and restrictions set out in the third level. In 
Table 6 is shown an example of the process and results, to detail security 
mechanisms for each message. 
 
4.5 Message Contents 
It is the conformation of each message with its specific contents and 
succession, in an orderly form. Message flow will be transformed into the 
Alice and Bob notation, by reviewing the detail achieved in the fourth level. 
We will form Table 7 analyzing and transforming each message with its 
recommended mechanism(s), to the appropriate Alice and Bob notation 
(Abadi & Rogaway, 2002; Doghmi, et al., 2007) described in Table 7. 
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The notation used in level 5 considers messages A as a set of terms 
freely generated from atomic message sets (t), consisting of nonces, time 
stamps, names of agents, participants or principals, label and a set of keys K, 
concatenation messages, using the semicolon notation: m1; m2 and 
encryption with {|m|} k, where k 𝜖 K and m1, m2 𝜖  A, with h(t) as the result 
of applying the hash function to message t, Na, Nb as nonces generated by the 
corresponding participant (Abadi & Rogaway, 2002; Guttman & Thayer-
Fábrega, 2002). 
Table 6: Messages and mechanisms 
 Information flow data 
Security 
mechanism 
Flow number 1 
Message flow From a to b 
Information exchanged Intent to form a session key with b 
Message parts 1 
Part-1 Sender name Digital signature 
••• 
Part-i 
 
We also assume two functions, the first mapping between principals 
a, b... to their public keys ka, kb… and the other, a pair of principals’ 〈a, b〉 
toward their shared symmetric keys kab. The set of keys K, comes with an 
inverse operator, mapping each member of a pair of keys from an 
asymmetric cryptosystem to the other: (ka)-1 = ka-, or each symmetric key to 
itself: (kab)-1 = kab, private keys are denoted as kpa y kpb. Function Partsk, 
maps a message t 𝜖 A to a set containing all sub-terms of t that are accessible 
by knowing the set of keys K, and [[t]]a the message t digitally signed with 
a’s private key.  
Table 7 is made from Table 1 made at the first abstraction level to 
check the orderly succession of participants who exchange messages, here 
we develop a similar table in Alice and Bob notation, with the contents of 
each message, and an arrow indicating the directions of sending and 
receiving according to their communication requirements, arranged so that 
they achieve the protocol’s objective; all participants should appear in the 
table. 
Table 7: Message flow and contents 
Protocol step Message flow Message contents 
1 a ⟶ b [[a]] a 
2 b ⟶  a [[b; {|a; Nb1|} kbs]] b 
… … … 
n a ⟶ s [[a; b; Na; {|a; Nb1|} kbs]] a 
 
4.6 Authentication tests based upon the Strand Spaces Model 
Is the conversion of protocol into the Strand Spaces model (Guttman, 
2002; Oceanasek & Sveda, 2006) and its verification by authentication tests 
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(Guttman & Thayer-Fábrega, 2002), which require protocol conversion into 
the Strand Spaces model, to be analyzed in order to confirm that they are 
complying with any of the three tests; otherwise we will return to level 1. 
 
4.7 Application example  
The aims of this protocol is to establish a shared session key between 
two parties with mutual authentication using symmetric cryptography 
supported with an online server, with contributory agreement. To show an 
example of this methodology, we used the well-known NSSK Protocol, also 
known as Symmetric Cryptography NSPK. 
 
4.7.1 Protocol objectives 
The designer will describe the environment and through what means the 
information transmission will be carried out, applying the questions proposed 
in 4.1. 
1. To establish a session key between two parties within a public 
network, in order to protect subsequent communication. 
2. Three participants. 
3. Initiator - a, Receiver - b, Server - s (trusted third party). 
4. Data necessary to build a session a key among the three 
participants, enabling secure communication between the first 
two a and b. 
5. Initiator (a) will call the other participant (b). The receiver (b) 
responds accepting the transmission. Each participant (a) and (b) 
contributes with a portion of the session key. 
6. The server (s) will bring together contributions, forms the session 
key and the server (s) sends to the initiator (a) the joint key. The 
initiator (a) informs the recipient (b) the resulting key. 
7. The resulting information flow is presented in Table 8. 
Table 8: Information flow for NSSK Protocol 
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From Table 8 the designer has to identify those data that uniquely 
each participant should know, because it could increase the number of flows, 
and if so increased, assure that they are alternated between participants; 
otherwise Table 8 must be reorganized to achieve the objective of the 
protocol.  
Based on the operational environment and the client’s restrictions, the 
designer states the answers to the questions posed at this Level 1, to select an 
option on Table 2 in order to define more clearly the protocol’s objective: 
1. Protocol operates in Internet. 
2. Requires mutual authentication between participants and 
unauthenticated messages. 
3. Short-term keys. 
4. Contributory agreement, with the use of an online server. 
 
4.7.2 Protocol constraints 
Once information flows are identified the designer will review the 
contents description, to specify in detail the information exchanged and 
threats perceived by each participant, then applying the Dolev-Yao Model 
(1983) he will link them to the security goals to fulfill, as presented in Table 
9. 
Table 9: Constraints for NSSK Protocol 
Flow  
numb
er 
Infor-
mation 
flow 
Information 
exchanged Threat A C I NR 
1 From a to b Intent to form a session key with b 
You are communicating 
with an attacker X   X 
2 From b to a 
Acceptance of deal, 
using a unique data 
for trusted third party 
You are communicating 
with an attacker X  X X 
3 From a to s Intent to form a session key with b 
A spy is recording and 
compromising the data 
transmission 
X  X X 
4 From s to a Accepts, forming and sending the key 
A spy is recording and 
compromising the data 
transmission 
X X X  
5 From a to b Sends the session key You are communicating with an attacker X    
6 From b to a 
Sends a nonce 
encrypted with the 
session key 
You are communicating 
with an attacker X    
7 From a to b 
Sends the previous 
nonce, modified and 
encrypted with the 
session key 
You are communicating 
with an attacker X    
A = Authentication, C = Confidentiality, I = Integrity, NR = Non repudiation. 
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4.7.3 Security Mechanisms 
The designer will link the security goals he wants to achieve with the 
security mechanisms listed in Section 3.1 and summarized in Table 5, 
analyzing each information flow and content separate into parts to determine 
what to encrypt, where to use a digital signature, or where to apply a hash, 
etc. At least one mechanism is required to deal with each detected threat 
related to each security goal, gradually scoring the resulting matrix of the 
previous level, taking into account the flow and the recommendations of the 
design principles, as presented in Table 10. 
Table 10: Mechanisms for NSSK Protocol 
Flow 
number 
Infor-
mation 
flow 
Information 
exchanged A C I NR 
1 From a to b 
Intent to form a 
session key with b 
X Sender 
name   
X Sender 
digital 
signature 
2 From b to a 
Acceptance of deal, 
using a unique data 
for trusted third 
party 
X Sender 
name  
X 
Applying 
a hash 
function 
X 
Sender 
digital 
signature 
3 From a to s 
Intent to form a 
session key with b 
X Sender 
name  
X 
Applying 
a hash 
function 
X Sender 
digital 
signature 
4 From s to a 
Accepts, forming 
and sending the key 
X Sender 
name 
X Encryp-
tion of 
sensitive 
data 
X 
Applying 
a hash 
function 
 
5 From a to b 
Sends the session 
key 
X Sender 
name    
6 From b to a 
Sends a nonce 
encrypted with the 
session key 
X Sender 
name    
7 From a to b 
Sends the previous 
nonce, modified 
and encrypted with 
the session key 
X Sender 
name    
A = Authentication, C = Confidentiality, I = Integrity, NR = Non repudiation. 
 
4.7.4 Messages 
We will form Table 11 analyzing and relating each of the resulting 
messages with the appropriate mechanism according to the characteristics 
and restrictions set out in the third abstraction level according to Table 5. 
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Table 11: Information flow and mechanisms for NSSK Protocol 
 Information flow data 
Security mechanism 
Flow number 1 
Information flow From a to b 
Exchanged information Intent to form a session key with b 
Quantity of parts 1 
Part-1 a (a’s) Digital signature 
We will continue the process until the last flow is reached. 
 
4.7.5 Sequence and Message content 
Resulting Table 12 is taken from the first and the previous levels to 
check the orderly succession of participants who exchange messages, with an 
arrow indicating the directions of sending and receiving according to their 
communication requirements, arranged so that they achieve the protocol’s 
objective. All participants should appear in the table: 
Table 12: Messages flow and contents for NSSK Protocol 
Protocol step Message flow Message content 
1 a ⟶ b [[a]] a 
2 b ⟶  a [[b; {|a; Nb1|} kbs]] b 
3 a ⟶ s [[a; b; Na; {|a; Nb1|} kbs]] a 
4 s ⟶  a {|kab; b; Na; {| kab; a; Nb1|} kbs |} kas 
5 a ⟶ b {| kab; a; Nb1|} kbs 
6 b ⟶  a {|Nb2|} kab 
7 a ⟶ b {|Nb2+1|} kab 
 
4.7.6 Authentication tests based upon the Strand Spaces Model 
Authentication tests require protocol conversion into the Strand 
Spaces model, to be analyzed in order to confirm that they are complying 
with any of the three tests; otherwise we will return to Level 1, as presented 
in Figure 2. 
 
5. Conclusion and future work 
This document proposed a new methodology for security protocol 
design step-by step, showing a feasible, inexpensive and safe way to deliver 
a protocol in the Alice and Bob notation and has demonstrated its utility 
through one application validated with authentication tests. The main 
contribution of this work is a novel and comprehensive methodology, based 
on a new set of design principles, which also meets the functional 
requirements and security goals requested by the protocol users. This work 
faces the security protocol’s design challenge of gathering a complete and 
minimum series of rules that are at the same time logically consistent and 
possible to implement efficiently.  
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Step  a  b  Authentication Tests 
1 +n1 • [[a]] a • -m1  
  Unsolicited Test 
 ⇓  ⇓ +m2  2 -n2 • [[b; {|a; Nb1|} kbs]] b • 
  Outgoing Test 
  ⇓  s  
 
3 +n3 • [[a; b; Na; {|a; Nb1|} kbs]] a • -p1 
    
 ⇓  ⇓  
4 -n4 • {|kab; b; Na; {| kab; a; Nb1|} kbs |} kas • +p2 
  Outgoing Test 
 ⇓   
5 +n5 • {| kab; a; Nb1|} kbs • -m3 
   
 ⇓  ⇓ +m4 6 -n6 • {|Nb2|} kab • 
  Outgoing Test 
 ⇓  ⇓ -m5  7 +n7 • {|Nb2+1|} kab • 
  Outgoing Test 
Figure 2: Strand Spaces and authentication tests for NSSK Protocol 
 
The presented methodology was proven with Guttman’s 
authentication tests (2002), which give the possibility to infer that 
participants in a protocol run are not intruders (Dolev & Yao, 1983), also 
fulfills four of the most important goals of security protocols, namely 
authentication, confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation, accompanying 
its designers and their clients in a systematic and systemic design process 
that includes the client’s needs and the constraints that must be imposed to 
achieve the desired security goals, through a simple, structured and easy to 
apply process, it allows building complex protocols by successive 
refinements, from the establishment of secure associations in simple cases, to 
specialized protocols. 
This methodology leads us to modular implementation, avoiding 
complex reasoning on a full protocol, allowing designers to focus on relevant 
variables within a certain abstraction level, without taking into account the 
complexities of pre-and post-levels; following a Top-Down and modular 
approach to software design and development (Kendall & Kendall, 2008). 
We focused in this work on the first layer (application) of the seven-
layer ISO/OSI Model (Gollman, 2006); based on its provision of a useful 
abstraction to discuss security in data transmission networks, and because it 
allows us to design services tailored to a specific need, reducing complexity, 
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standardizing interfaces, facilitating modular engineering and allowing 
interoperability between layers, which are the main advantages of ISO/OSI 
model (Gollman, 2006; Holzmann, 1991; Stallings, 2006). 
According to literature related to specifications we found that it has 
been difficult to specify the desired properties in existing formalisms, 
because formal methods can express operation, but not typical security goals 
such as confidentiality, authentication, non-repudiation and integrity; in this 
work we involve these goals on each abstraction level. The presented 
methodology complements the conformed protocol (sequence of messages) 
with clear specifications and explanations of other forms coming from the 
detailed organization of the design principles. Once protocol specifications 
are made, the analysis and design continues: these processes consist of 
recurring activities of design on each abstraction level, until we reach the 
final product. 
One limitation of this work is the restriction on two participants, or 
three if a trusted third party is needed. Another originates from the 
requirement of successive refinements: the designer that uses it must have a 
close relationship with clients in order to extract all their relevant needs, 
goals and constraints. Design principles were selected from current literature, 
when new principles, applications or technological developments arise that 
affect protocol’s internal or operational environment, it might be necessary 
to review this methodology. 
Further research emerges from this work, in the automation of the 
methodology, so that designer’s time and resources may be used more 
efficiently, while assuring that sufficient assumptions are provided to specify 
and construct a model in a more dynamic environment. As we consider only 
four security goals, fulfillment of others requires additional work. 
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